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ABSTRACT 
The Royal Navy uses Hawk jets to simulate sea-skimming missile attacks 
against vessels as part of their training regulations. However to best achieve 
these goals, pilots of the Hawk are required to fly at approximately 50 feet 
above sea level to accurately mimic the flight path of a missile. Despite this 
need the Hawk is not equipped with a radar altimeter and instead relies upon 
pilot skill to ensure the safe completion of the operation. Incidents whereby 
the Hawk jets have struck the water are however recorded, risking pilot safety. 
This paper explores the Hawk missile simulation task using a STAMP-STPA 
methodology to map the key stakeholders within this operation, explore areas 
of potential risk in the system and make a series of recommendations to 
improve overall systemic safety of the operation.   
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During the Falklands War, 2nd April – 14th June 1982, the Royal Navy Type 42 
destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was operating as part of a picket force ahead of the larger 
Royal Navy task force. On the 4th of May, 1982, an Exocet anti-ship missile, launched 
by an Argentine Navy Super Étendard fighter-bomber, struck the destroyer. The threat 
was not identified as a sea-skimming missile until crew aboard HMS Sheffield saw 
smoke rising from the missiles exhaust approximately five seconds before impact. Due 
to the lack of threat identification, HMS Sheffield failed to take any defensive or 
evasive manoeuvres to avoid the missile, and did not deploy any countermeasures, 
such as launching chaff or preparing defensive fire. Although evidence suggests that 
the missile did not detonate, heat from the missile ignited HMS Sheffield’s fuel reserve 
and fire engulfed the ship. This extensive fire, combined with the initial impact of the 
missile, resulted in the death of 20 Royal Navy seamen and the eventual foundering of 
the vessel, the first Royal Navy vessel sunk since the Second World War (Board of 
Inquiry, 1982).   
 Following the sinking of HMS Sheffield, the Royal Navy instigated significant 
procedural changes for dealing with missile attacks, including the required manoeuvres 
that vessels should take and immediate defensive actions that should be followed. 
Significantly, a need was identified to focus on crew training to enable the crew to 
rapidly respond to the threat of a fast approaching sea-skimming missile, including 
detection of the incoming threat, and required countermeasures to attempt to avoid the 
impact of the missile. To facilitate this training, during live sea training operations, the 
Royal Navy utilises low flying Hawk T1/1A jets to mimic the flight path of a sea-
skimming missile in order to realistically train ship radar operators and gunners (Royal 
Navy, 2012). This training operation is conducted by the Royal Navy, and its subsidiary 
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force, the Fleet Air Arm, without direct involvement of the Royal Air Force (RAF).  
The Hawk T1/1A, used in this training operation, originally known as the Hawker 
Siddeley, first entered service with the RAF in 1976. The Hawk T1/1A is a tandem-seat 
transonic ground-attack and training aircraft, with a max speed of 625mph at sea level. 
Traditionally flown by a forward pilot and rear seated trainer, the Hawk can also be 
flown and operated by a single pilot. As an older aircraft, the Hawk T1/1A does not 
possess a Head Up Display (HUD) and is reliant on primarily analogue gauges. The 
Hawk T1/1A jets used within missile training simulations have been made famous for 
its use by the RAF acrobatic team, the Red Arrows. Despite newer models of the Hawk 
being developed by BAE Systems, such as the Advanced Hawk, equipped with 
improved safety systems, including an integrated HUD, these are not available to the 
Fleet Air Arm for missile simulation training who maintain the use of previously retired 
RAF T1/1A Hawks.  
 In order to best mimic the approach of a sea-skimming missile the Hawk must 
be flown at very low altitudes, ideally less than 50 feet above sea level. Due to cost 
implications and original design specifications, the Hawk T1/1A is not fitted with a 
Radar Altimeter (Rad-Alt), which provides accurate measurement of the altitude of the 
aircraft above the sea. Indeed, to refit a single Hawk T1/1A with Rad-Alt would cost 
approximately £1 million, making such a refit financially unviable, particularly as the 
aircraft is being phased out of service. This makes flying the Hawk T1/1A at low 
altitude extremely difficult, and requires a high level of expertise to perform safely. 
This training operation therefore has significant safety implications. The pilot must rely 
upon visual cues to gauge altitude, whilst flying as low and as fast as possible to mimic 
the flight path of a missile. To illustrate the risk associated with this operation, in 2000, 
one Hawk T1/1A suffered a sea strike incident, whereby the jet struck the surface of the 
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sea during a training operation (Stanton & Harvey, 2017). Although there was no 
resulting loss of life, the aircraft involved suffered considerable damage to its 
underside. To mitigate the immanent Risk to Life (RtL), the Fleet Air Arm increased 
the minimum altitude for the Hawk during such operations. This risk mitigation 
however began to erode the realism of the training operations, as the aircraft would 
inevitably be detected earlier than would be the case of an incoming missile in an active 
combat zone, allowing radar and gunnery officers and crew greater time to respond to 
the encroaching threat. 
Despite access to fast jet and fixed-wing aircraft, the primary focus of the Fleet 
Air Arm has traditionally been rotary-wing and Harrier jet operations. The Fleet Air 
Arm has therefore historically lacked pilots skilled in fast jet operations, a prerequisite 
for Hawk training simulations. To reduce the risk to Hawk pilots, Royal Navy vessels 
and attendant crew, retired RAF pilots, independently contracted by the Fleet Air Arm, 
were used to fly the Hawk jets used for missile simulation training operations. The 
commissioned pilots had extensive experience in military fast jets, including low 
altitude flight, gained from their previous service within the RAF. This experience 
acted to provide a level of mitigation against the pilots’ RtL for the Hawk missile 
simulation task. Following an overhaul to British defense strategy (Strategic Defense 
and Security Review, October 2010), the British Government (2010) decided to retire 
the aging Harrier jet from active service. As a consequence of this decisions, trainee 
Fleet Air Arm pilots were diverted from Harrier training into Hawk training, leading to 
a high number of, albeit relatively inexperienced, pilots, becoming available to the 
Fleet Air Arm for training operations. Due the junior pilots’ lack of experience, 
reassessment of the risks associated with the Hawk missile simulation task was deemed 
necessary. This reassessment was required to consider both the immediate risk to the 
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pilots operating the Hawk jets but also the long-term safety of the ships crew, who 
require training for live combat theatres in the future.  
In addition to direct changes within the Fleet Air Arm, Hawk missile simulation 
exercises were significantly impacted by safety related cultural changes within the 
British Military. Following the catastrophic mid-air explosion of RAF Nimrod XV230 
in 2006, which resulted in the total loss of the aircraft and the deaths of all 14 
personnel on-board during a standard refueling procedure, the British Government 
requested a comprehensive review into the airworthiness and safe operation of the 
Nimrod aircraft and military operation more generally. This report was delivered by 
Haddon-Cave (2009) who concluded that safe military training operations were 
undermined by a safety culture that held assumptions of safety due to previous safe 
operations. The report suggested that a shift in organizational culture towards business 
and financial targets ‘at the expense of functional values such as safety and 
airworthiness’ (p. 355) also negatively impacted the safe completion of operations 
(Haddon-Cave 2009). As a consequence, Haddon-Cave (2009) recommended the 
establishment of an independent Military Aviation Authority (MAA) to properly assess 
RtL and shape future safety culture within all British military aviation arms, including 
the RAF and Fleet Air Arm. As a consequence of the Haddon-Cave (2009) report a 
culture change was seen within British military aviation resulting in a decision to 
assign individual accountability for RtL assessments to ‘Duty Holders’ (DH), where 
previously responsibility for risk had been held at the organization level. The newly 
established MAA produced guidelines for the assessment of RtL, in the form of the 
Defense Aviation Hazard Risk Matrix (MAA, 2011), which supports the classification 
of single risks according to their estimated severity (catastrophic, critical, major, 
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minor) and likelihood (frequent, occasional, remote, improbable). The resulting risk 
level determines at which level of DH the risk is held.  
The goal of safety management within the UK military is to reduce risk to a 
level which is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP): this is reached when ‘the 
cost of further reduction is grossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk reduction’ 
(Ministry of Defence, 2007). In order to reduce the associated RtL of the Hawk missile 
simulation training exercise to a level that was ALARP, a decision was taken by the 
Royal Navy, with SME advice, to increase the minimum height above sea level that the 
Hawks were allowed to safely operate. Taken with previous altitude increases, this 
decision further degraded. By flying at an increased altitude, the Hawk can no longer 
accurately simulate sea-skimming missile attacks on surface ships thereby denigrating 
Royal Navy surface fleet and ships crew training against very low-level targets.  
In addition to organisational changes, safety and risk assessment within 
British military aviation underwent a series of cultural changes following the 
Haddon-Cave (2009) report. Traditionally, the Royal Navy and Fleet Air Arm 
relied upon quantitative risk assessment techniques including Technique for 
Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain, 1964; Swain & Guttmann, 1983; 
Boring, 2012) and Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach 
(SHERPA) (Embrey, 1986). These techniques quantitatively model the probability 
of humans within the system making an error, reminiscent of Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA; Barlow, 1973). Within the developing safety culture changes however, the 
British Military holds the growing acceptance that such methods can be seen as 
reductionist and can fail to actively attribute the risks associated with the 
interactions of different subsystems. This acceptance matches a wider trend in 
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safety research within academic research towards system-based approaches 
(Walker, Salmon, Bedinger, & Stanton, 2017; Salmon et al., 2017). To this end, 
the military has sought to increase the use of systemic approaches to safety to 
augment previously completed assessments. Of the developed systemic 
approaches within the larger academic literature, Systems Theoretic Accident 
Model and Process (STAMP) approach (Leveson, 2004) and its corresponding 
hazard analysis Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) has become the most 
prolific and widely cited (Underwood & Waterson, 2012). STAMP-STPA has 
been used to explore system safety across a variety of domains including road 
transport (Salmon, Read, & Stevens, 2016) rail accidents (Underwood, & 
Waterson, 2014) and potential aviation accidents (Allison, Revell, Sears & 
Stanton, 2017).  
Despite its clear domain agnostic utility, STAMP-STPA has been less used 
within the military domain (Pereira, Lee & Howard, 2006), especially in relationship to 
training paradigms. Indeed, development of the systemic approach to address safety 
within military systems of systems has been a significant challenge to date. Within 
STAMP-STPA, systems can be viewed as “interrelated components that are kept in a 
state of dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information and control.” (p. 250, 
Leveson, 2004). STAMP-STPA can be seen as advantageous over the linear fault and 
error methods such as THERP and FTA previously used within the military domain in 
that it seeks to improve the safety of the system as a system as a whole, rather than 
attribute blame on individual personnel for an accident. To achieve this, STAMP-
STPA considers the role of individuals, organizations and technology within the same 
analysis. This allows safety to be considered as a dynamic, as apposed to linear, 
process, characterised by feedforward and feedback, from both human, technological 
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and organizational agents. The identification of the non-linear, interactive, coupling 
between different stakeholders and the constraints imposed by the different 
stakeholders, makes STAMP-STPA ideal for understanding complex systems 
(Leveson, 2004) and systems of systems (Salmon et al., 2012; Harvey & Stanton, 
2014; Allison et al., 2017). STAMP-STPA analysis therefore provides a model of 
potential accidents, which Leveson (2011) describes as an ideal basis for investigation, 
analysis, prevention and risk assessment 
This paper aims to assess the risk to life that surrounds the Hawk missile 
simulation scenario and identify the primary stakeholders within the system of 
systems. To achieve these aims, a STAMP-STPA analysis of the Hawk missile 
simulation scenario was undertaken. As discussed, previous risk assessment 
strategies used by the Royal Navy have been viewed as reductionist and have 
historically failed to ensure safe operations. By offering an alternative approach to 
safety, it is argued that STAMP-STPA can provide novel safety insights, not 
offered by alternative methods. This work therefore offers a novel use of the 
STAMP-STPA methodology, a method with limited previous application within 
the military domain. 
 
METHOD 
SME INVOLVEMENT  
Understanding of the Hawk RtL case study was gained through and initial 
workshop and subsequent interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs). An 
initial workshop was conducted with nine independent SMEs. Eight SMEs were 
military and industrial stakeholders who had a job role focused in developing 
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military safety culture following the Haddon-Cave (2009) report. The final SME 
participant was an independent industry Human Factors professional. During this 
workshop, the Hawk RtL scenario was explored and key stakeholders were 
identified.  
To achieve a greater understanding, analysts were provided with detailed 
overview of the Hawk RtL scenario in a subsequent interview with an SME from 
Air Command, a senior Wing Commander. This resulted in a detailed account of 
the missile simulation task, which was further supplemented by information 
available within official documentation including Military Aviation Authority 
guidelines (MAA regulatory publications, 2016), and Flag Officer Sea Training 
(FOST) guidance (International Defence Training Royal Navy, n.d.). Two analysts 
completed a second, in-depth interview with the same Air Command SME for 
greater insight and clarification. During the second interview, the ten 
characteristics of a system of systems (Harvey & Stanton, 2014) were used to 
structure the discussion and elicit detailed information about Hawk operations for 
missile simulation training.   
Upon completion of the analysis, findings were presented to an 
independent team of SMEs who had considerable experience working in the 
defence sector and with previous safety experience for review, comment and 
feedback.     
 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL 
Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) 
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The cornerstone of the STAMP methodology is the identification of the 
stakeholders at all levels within the system, and the constraints that they impose on 
other stakeholders. The control structure represents the highest level of abstraction 
within the system of systems (Harvey & Stanton, 2014).  By organising the layers 
of constraints that link these stakeholders, it is possible to develop a hierarchical 
control structure that maps the systems under investigation (Stanton et al., 2013). 
The initial step of the STAMP analysis therefore involves the construction of a 
high-level hierarchical control structure. The control structure maps the system of 
systems under investigation and identifies all the stakeholders that contribute to 
the system.  
These stakeholders are linked by control actions, typically represented by 
labelled arrows. Control actions constitute the main source of feedback and 
interaction between the different stakeholders. Some control actions are 
continuously performed during the scenario under investigation whilst others 
denote intermittent actions, for example an action performed after an event has 
occurred. 
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
 Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA, Leveson, 2004, 2011) is used 
to make predictions about the future safety of systems; based on control theory and 
the use of consistent guide sentences. STAMP-STPA views systems as interrelated 
components linked by loops, which control the flow of information within the 
system and, therefore, maintain a state of dynamic equilibrium (Leveson, 2011). A 
key concept in STAMP-STPA is that of constraints: accidents occur not due to the 
occurrence of an event; rather accidents are the result of a lack of appropriate 
constraints applied at points within the control structure (i.e. feed-forward and 
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feedback loops). Representing interactions within a system as a hierarchy of 
control loops allows these constraints to be identified. STPA maps these control 
loops and identifies potential unsafe control actions (UCAs) through the use of a 
standardised off-nominal taxonomy. The off-nominal taxonomy is driven by the 
use of four guide sentences: 
1) Action required but not provided;  
2) Unsafe action provided;  
3) Incorrect timing / order; 
4) Stopped too soon / applied too long.  
These guide sentences are set as part of the standardised STPA 
methodology (Leveson, 2004) and are applied to each of the control actions that 
were identified in the initial stage. The guide sentences are designed to allow 
analysts to identify all potential UCAs within the system and elicit all the possible 
failings in order to create the complete failure taxonomy. When applying these 
guide sentences, each may generate multiple UCAs, equally when exploring some 
systems not all are applicable in all cases.  
For the final stage of the analysis, the causes for the UCAs can be explored 
by constructing feedback loops for identified UCAs. This enables the researchers 
to examine how multiple UCAs can interact as well as explore the causal factors 
behind the UCAs. Once this stage is complete it is possible to begin to develop 
safety constraints for each of the potential UCAs. These are constraints that should 
be imposed on the system to prevent the UCAs from occurring, reducing the 
likelihood of an accident (Leveson, 2004). In this regard, the addition of novel 
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safety constraints allows the analysts to progress the STAMP-STPA methodology 
to allow for the development of potential mitigation strategies. 
As discussed, STAMP-STPA follows an established step-by-step process to 
construct a control structure, identify ‘unsafe control actions’ (UCAs) and identify 
interactions and causal factors. Before this can be completed however, the primary 
hazards of the scenario under investigation must be identified. The STAMP model 
defines a hazard as “A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular 
set of worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss)”  (p14, 
Thomas, et al., 2013). As an example, an accident could be the exposure of people to 
toxic chemicals and the related hazard would be the release of toxic chemicals into the 
atmosphere (Thomas et al., 2013). Prior to the start of the analysis, the research team 
were required to define the potential hazards that could lead to an accident. In the Hawk 
RtL case study, a potential accident was defined as any event leading to death or injury, 
with the potential hazards being defined as: 
 Hawk strikes the sea 
 Hawk strikes the Frigate 
 Inadequate training of Frigate crew for future missile attack 
The initial risks relating to the Hawk are primarily concerned with the Hawk flying at 
low altitude. Should the Hawk strikes the sea, as occurred within the incident in 2000, 
the aircraft is likely to suffer considerable damage, risking the pilot’s safety and the 
airworthiness of the aircraft. Should the aircraft strike the frigate, the Hawk itself is 
likely to suffer catastrophic damage, providing substantial risk to the pilot’s safety. The 
Frigate is also likely to suffer significant damage, risking the lives of crew and 
potentially seaworthiness of the vessel. Should the Hawk fail to fly at low altitude, the 
Hawk will appear on the frigate’s radar earlier than an incoming missile would. This 
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would result in the incomplete training of the frigates crew, potentially endangering the 
lives of the crew in future live fire conflict zones.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Following STAMP-STPA procedure, the mapped control structure for Hawk 
missile simulation task is shown in Figure 1. The developed control structure takes a 
hierarchical form, with the addition of the ‘Sea’ component operating in parallel, linking 
to the pilot and frigate crew. Seven stakeholders were identified, Military Aviation 
Authority, who operates as regulator, Duty Holder, Pilot, Hawk Jet, Frigate, Crew and 
the Sea. Each of the seven stakeholders are linked by unique Control Actions, mapping 
the stakeholder relationships  
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Figure 1 Control structure for the Hawk Risk to Life (RtL) case study 
Working through the control structure presented in Figure 1, the Regulator, the 
Military Aviation Authority (MAA), provides the Duty Holder with assessment 
procedures for the Hawk RtL scenario. The MAA acts as the single regulatory 
authority responsible for regulating all aspects of air safety across British defense. 
The MAA has full oversight of all defence aviation activity, including the operation of 
the Hawk RtL scenario. A key directive of the MAA is to maintain appropriate 
Military Aviation Authority (MAA) 
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standards of air safety (ALARP) within defense operations.  The duty holder’s prime 
role is to take responsibility for implementing effective Aviation Safety Management 
Systems and ensuring that their air operations are at all times conducted at a level of 
safety that is at least ALARP, as laid out in MAA Regulatory Article 1022. In practical 
terms, the key role of the duty holder is to provide pilots with the boundaries of flight 
operations to stay within what is judged acceptable risk. The pilot is responsible for the 
safe control of the aircraft within these boundaries. The pilot is required to use readings 
provided by the on-board sensors to accurately simulate a potential missile attack and 
provide an accurate radar image to the frigate. The radar sensors of the frigate detect an 
object that is approaching the vessel rapidly. The crew of the frigate is required to 
classify an event like this as threat that requires preparation of its defense weapons. 
The frigate’s radar continues to track the objects progress towards the vessel. During 
this time, the frigates crew executes all required defense operations. Once the exercise 
is complete, the pilot is required to report to the duty holder any new risks that have 
been identified within the missile simulation exercise. The Duty Holder has a 
responsibility to report to the Regulator any accidents or near misses. Operating in 
parallel to the primary control structure is the sea, which is a key stakeholder with the 
operation. The sea is not static during the simulation exercise but rather subject to 
different weather conditions. The pilot must frequently interpret the height of the Hawk 
above the sea to ensure safe operations . The sea also provides key conditional variable 
for the crew of the frigate to interpret. Sea conditions can impact the potential 
countermeasures available to avoid the simulated missile strike, whether the frigate is 
required to “destroy” the simulated missile, using on board defensive weapons or 
undertake maneuvers to avoid the strike.             
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 Based on the control structure presented within Figure 1, each of the control 
actions were considered in turn to compile a failure taxonomy using the standardised 
STAMP-STPA method as discussed previously. In total, 88 UCAs were identified for 
the Hawk RtL case study. Examples of generated UCAs using each of the guide 
sentences are provided in Table 1.  
Table 1 Example analysis of two control actions against STPA guide sentences 
Control action From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action 
Provision of 
procedures for 
assessment of RtL 
Regulator Duty 
Holder 
Action required 
but not provided 
Fail to provide procedures 
for RtL assessment 
   Unsafe action 
provided 
Provide wrong procedures 
for RtL assessment 
   Incorrect order / 
timing 
Provide RtL procedures too 
late 
   Stopped too soon 
/ applied too long 
RtL process overly 
complex and bureaucratic 
    RtL process too vague 
Safe control of aircraft 
at 250 feet, to simulate 
missile 
Pilot Hawk Action required 
but not provided 
Failure to maintain safe 
control of the aircraft 
below 250 feet 
   Action required 
but not provided 
Failure to maintain safe 
control of the aircraft 
above 250 feet 
   Stopped too soon 
/ applied too long 
Move out of safe altitude 
too early 
   Stopped too soon 
/ applied too long 
Move out of safe altitude 
too late 
*RtL Risk to Life 
 Safety constraints were defined for each of the identified UCAs. The safety 
constraints for the example UCAs presented in Table 1 are presented in Table 2. Safety 
constraints were however generated for all 88 identified UCAs, and are presented within 
the appendix.  
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Table 2 Example analysis of safety constraints assigned to UCAs 
Unsafe Control Action Safety Constraint 
Fail to provide procedures for 
RtL assessment 
Must provide procedures for RtL assessment 
Provide wrong procedures for 
RtL assessment 
Must provide correct procedures for RtL assessment 
Provide RtL procedures too late Must provide procedures for RtL assessment in sufficient 
time 
RtL process overly complex and 
bureaucratic 
RtL process should not be overly complex and 
bureaucratic 
RtL process too vague RtL process should not be too vague 
 
Failure to maintain safe control 
of the aircraft below 250 feet 
Must maintain safe control of aircraft 
Failure to maintain safe control 
of the aircraft above 250 feet 
Must maintain safe control of aircraft 
Move out of safe altitude too 
early 
Hawk must stay at correct altitude for appropriate 
duration 
Move out of safe altitude too late Hawk must stay at correct altitude for appropriate 
duration 
*RtL Risk to Life 
Example mapping of UCAs is illustrated for two of the UCAs described in Table 
2 above: “fail to provide procedures for RtL” (Figure 2) and “failure to maintain safe 
control of the aircraft below 250 feet” (Figure 3). Figure 2 shows that for the UCA of 
“fail to provide procedures for RtL”, the regulator may fail to define procedures for 
RtL assessment due to an incorrect, incomplete or inconsistent process model relating 
to current regulations, previous incidents/ accidents, risk assessment procedures or the 
definition of risk likelihood or severity. This in turn can result in a failure to document 
procedures, and/ or a failure to provide the documentation to required parties. Further 
risks are identified in that the regulator, the MAA, is required to ensure that duty 
holders receive all appropriate documentation. Duty holders are required to use this 
documentation and establish suitable procedures for RtL assessments, and to ensure 
that RtL assessments are carried out. Mirroring the relationship between regulator and 
duty holder, the duty holder also has responsibility to feedback RtL assessments back 
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to the regulator. Within this example, no mechanical failure endangers the safety of 
either the pilot of the Hawk or the crew of the Frigate. Such a relationship would be 
traditionally not be considered by the safety approaches used within the British 
military. This relationship, highlighted by the STAMP-STPA analysis is however 
crucial for ensuring the safety of the overall training operation.   
With the risk of “failure to maintain safe control of the aircraft below 250 feet” 
(Figure 3) the pilot may fail to understand or input the correct control actions to the 
Hawk due to an incorrect, incomplete or inconsistent process model relating to the 
required control inputs, feedback from the aircraft or safety regulations for flying 
below 250 feet. Alternatively, there could be a failure of aircraft controls, whereby the 
aircraft does not respond to the control inputs of the pilot. This lack of control 
response suggests a failure of aircraft components, and would result in the Hawks 
behaviour becoming unsafe. Further component failure could result in feedback not 
being received by the pilot, leading to, or reinforcing, the pilots misunderstanding of 
required control inputs. Although the failures identified within this example are not 
unique to the STAMP-STPA approach, this example does demonstrate the utility of 
the method. In addition to identifying potential areas of unsafe operations within 
stakeholder relationships, STAMP-STPA is also able to identify the risks and 
consequence of component failure.    
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Figure 2. Causal factors identified for the UCA ‘fail to provide procedures for RtL 
assessment’, between the regulator and duty holder. 
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Figure 3. Causal factors identified for the UCA ‘failure to maintain safe control of 
aircraft below 250 feet’, between the pilot and hawk 
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Each of the 88 UCAs identified within this work lead to the generation of a 
corresponding safety constraint designed to minimise the likelihood of each UCA 
occurring. Each safety constraint is presented within the appendix. Generated safety 
constraints fell into three main categories: 1) ensuring proper adherence to established 
procedures; 2) ensuring operations are adequately followed; and 3) ensuring sufficient 
training and experience is both possessed and generated by individuals operating 
within the system. By adequately employing the generated safety constraints the 
likelihood of an incident or an accident occurring can be reduced (Leveson, 2004). 
Each of these categories, and how the application of exemplar safety constraints can be 
used to improve the safety of the system, will be discussed in turn.   
Interviews with SMEs and official documentation revealed that extensive 
procedures are in place governing the Hawk missile simulation scenario, including 
predetermined minimum altitudes for the Hawk to operate. The present analysis 
highlighted that in order for the exercise to remain of value and safe, operational 
requirements must be followed. Within this scenario, the clearest example of this 
action is the pilot must ensure the “Safe control of the aircraft at approximately 250 
feet to simulate missile”. To achieve this goal it is essential that the pilot maintains safe 
control of the Hawk and must stay at a maximum 250 feet for the duration of the 
exercise. By flying higher than this altitude, the aircraft would appear on radar 
considerably sooner than would be the case of a sea-skimming missile, defeating the 
purpose of the exercise. Flying significantly lower than this level however risks the 
safety of the pilot and risks a repeat of the sea strike incident of 2000 (Stanton & 
Harvey, 2017), as discussed previously. Priority at all times must be given to the pilots’ 
safety however, in order to ensure that the aircraft is under control.  
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The Hawk missile simulation task is associated with considerable risks. Immediate 
risk is placed upon the pilot, due to the need to fly low and fast over the sea, with no 
accurate reading of altitude available. The pilot is reliant on visual cues of wave height 
and information provided by the Hawk’s barometric pressure altimeter, which can be 
inaccurate at very low altitude. To achieve these goals, the pilot must regularly 
interpret their height above the sea, allowing for sufficient time to respond to changes 
in wave amplitude and dynamics. Ensuring that Hawk pilots possess sufficient 
experience in fast, low altitude, operations is therefore essential in maintaining safety. 
As noted previously, retired RAF pilots are no longer commissioned to this training 
exercise but instead rather more junior Fleet Air Arm pilots are utilised. Appropriate 
procedures are essential in ensuring that the selected pilots possess the required 
experience to be able to complete these goals. 
Secondary risk is placed upon the Frigate and its attending crew. Frigate and crew 
are at direct risk of potential impact with the Hawk, should the pilot collide with the 
ships superstructure, by flying too low. Equally the Frigate and crew are also at risk of 
not receiving sufficient training should the Hawk approach too high. The Hawk missile 
simulation task provides essential training for crew to be able to accurate classify and 
take suitable action against such potential incoming threats.  By ensuring that crew 
training is adequate, future safety, including potentially within a live combat theatre, is 
improved. It is therefore essential that the Hawk missile simulation task generates 
sufficient experience and training for the crew of the frigate. The use and value of 
simulation training has seen across work domains and is now standard practice within 
aviation, medicine and the military (Salas, Wilson, Burke, & Priest, 2005).  Ensuring 
the simulation is representative of the real event is however paramount, reinforcing the 
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Hawks requirement to fly as low and fast as possible to accurately mimic the flight 
profile of a sea-skimming missile.   
The use of STAMP-STPA (Leveson, 2004; 2011) has provided a novel approach 
to examine where risk could emerge in the highly controlled Hawk missile simulation 
task. The use of a systemic approach to safety has allowed the researchers to consider a 
significantly wider array of risks, especially those relating to human-system 
interactions, than those previously identified using methods previously utilised by the 
Fleet Air Arm, including FTA (Barlow, 1973) and THERP (Swain, 1964 Swain & 
Guttmann, 1983; Boring, 2012). The use of the STAMP-STPA approach is however 
highly time consuming and reliant on the knowledge of both the SMEs available and 
the research team undertaking the analysis. Work is therefore needed within the safety 
community to provide support for systemic safety analysis, including STAMP-STPA 
to improve the availability of these tools. Dedicated software tools supporting such 
analysis are currently lacking and would be beneficial to increase the efficiency and 
level of fidelity of the analysis.           
The STAMP-STPA framework (Leveson, 2004; 2011) has been deployed within 
this study to explore the Hawk missile simulation task from a highly abstract 
perspective, using declassified information. Future detailed work is needed to explore 
the individual stakeholders that operate within all levels of the system in order to 
ensure that each stakeholder is operating as safely as they can. The analysis can also be 
extended to explore the potential safety implication of alternative military training 
operations to examine whether the insights gained from the current investigation can 
be applied universally to other operations. Finally, it would be beneficial to directly 
compare the insights gained from STAMP-STPA to alternative systemic safety 
methods such as FRAM, (Hollnagel, 2012), Accimaps (Rasmussen, 1997), and Event 
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Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) (Stanton, Baber, & Harris, 2008; Stanton, 
Salmon & Walker, 2018). This is especially apt when considering that EAST Broken 
Links approach has previously been used to explore the same training scenario 
(Stanton & Harvey, 2017). Although Underwood and Waterson (2014) suggests that 
STAMP-STPA offers the most comprehensive approach to exploring systemic safety, 
it would be negligent to suggest that other methods do not add additional benefit. 
Underwood and Waterson (2014) undertook an extensive comparison between 
STAMP-STPA and Accimaps and found that despite considerable differences between 
the two approaches, both offered unique insights when examining a rail accident. It 
would therefore be prudent to utilise alternative metrics to examine the relative 
benefits and limitation of different approaches.    
  
CONCLUSIONS 
The current work has applied the STAMP-STPA framework to examine 
Royal Navy Hawk missile simulation training. An evolving safety culture within 
the British Military as well as previous incidents within this specific training 
exercise have highlighted the need for modern approaches to safety within this 
domain.     
A control structure, mapping all key stakeholders within the Hawk missile 
simulation exercise was generated within STAMP. This was furthered to elicit 88 
potential UCAs using STPA. Finally, initial safety constraints have been provided 
for each identified UCA in order to reduce the likelihood of each UCA occurring 
and improve overall systemic safety. The developed safety constraints focused on 
ensuring adherence to require procedures; ensuring required operations are safely 
completed; and ensuring adequate training for all agents within the system. It is 
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argued that the STAMP-STPA approach offered qualitatively different insights 
that would be offered using traditional safety tools currently used within the 
military domain, highlighting the importance of pre-existing relationships and 
interactions between different stakeholders. Acting as a case study for use of the 
STAMP-STPA approach in the military domain, it is argued that systemic 
approaches can act to enhance overall safety.     
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The authors would like to thank Wing Commander Neil Bing (Bingo) of Air Cap So1 
Lightning, RAF High Wycombe, for his account of the Hawk Risk-to-Life case study 
and his very valuable insights into the challenges faced by this complex Sociotechnical 
System.  
 This work was part-funded by the Defense Human Capability Science and Technology 
Centre (DHCSTC) grant reference TIN 2.002. 
  
 26 
REFERENCES 
Allison, C. K., Revell, K. M., Sears, R., & Stanton, N. A. (2017). Systems 
Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) safety modelling applied 
to an aircraft rapid decompression event. Safety Science, 98, 159-166. 
Arnzen, H. E. (1964). Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. A powerful engineering 
tool for component and system optimization. 
Barlow, R. E. (1973). Fault Tree Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Board of Inquiry (1982) Loss of HMS Sheffield. Retrieved August 1st 2017, from 
http://www.admiraltytrilogy.com/read/BOI_Rpt_HMS_Sheffield_May82.p
df  
Boring, R. L. (2012). Fifty years of THERP and human reliability analysis (No. 
INL/CON-12-25623). Idaho National Laboratory (INL). 
Carlock, P. G., & Fenton, R. E. (2001). System of Systems (SoS) enterprise 
systems engineering for information‐intensive organizations. Systems 
Engineering, 4(4), 242-261. 
Embrey, D. E. (1986). SHERPA: A systematic human error reduction and 
prediction approach. In Proceedings of the international topical meeting on 
advances in human factors in nuclear power systems. Knoxville, 
Tennessee.  
H M Government (2010). Securing Britain in an age of uncertainty: the strategic 
defence and security review. London: The Stationery Office. 
 27 
Haddon-Cave, C. (2009). The Nimrod review. An independent review into broader 
issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in 
Afghanistan in 2006. . London: The Stationery Office. 
Hadian, S., & Madani, K. (2015). A system of systems approach to energy 
sustainability assessment: Are all renewables really green?. Ecological 
Indicators, 52, 194-206. 
Harris, D., & Stanton, N. A. (2010). Aviation as a system of systems: Preface to the 
special issue of human factors in aviation. Ergonomics, 53 (2), 145 – 148. 
Harvey, C., & Stanton, N. A. (2014). Safety in System-of-Systems: Ten Key 
Challenges. Safety Science, 70, 358-366. 
Hollnagel, E. (2012). FRAM, the functional resonance analysis method: modeling 
complex socio-technical systems. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
International Defence Training, Royal Navy (n.d.) Flag Officer Sea Training. 
Retrieved August 5th 2017, from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121109043853/http://www.m
od.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F1316923-78C0-45C4-819B-
512919DA153B/0/flagofficerseatraining.pdf 
Leveson, N. (2004). A new accident model for engineering safer systems. Safety 
science, 42(4), 237-270. 
Leveson, N. (2011). Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied to 
Safety. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. 
Leveson, N. G., Daouk, M., Dulac, N., & Marais, K. (2003). Applying STAMP in 
accident analysis. Second Workshop on the Investigation and Reporting of 
Accidents, Williamsburg, September 2003.   
 28 
MAA regulatory publications. (2016). Retrieved October 23, 2017, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/maa-regulatory-publications 
Maier, M. W. (1998). Architecting principles for systems‐of‐systems. Systems 
Engineering, 1(4), 267-284. 
Ministry Of Defence (2007). Defence Standard 00-56, Issue 4, Parts 1 & 2. 
London: MOD. 
Pereira, S.J., Lee, G. & Howard, J., (2006). A system-theoretic hazard analysis 
methodology for a non- advocate safety assessment of the ballistic missile 
defense system. Missile Defense Agency Washington DC.  
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling 
problem. Safety Science, 27(2), 183-213. 
Roberts, A. P., Stanton, N. A., & Fay, D. Land Ahoy! Understanding Submarine 
command and control during the completion of in shore operations, Human 
Factors, in Press, DOI: 10.1177/0018720817731678 
Royal Navy. (2012). Fleet Requirements Air Direction Unit (FRADU) [Online]. 
Royal Navy. Accessed January 11, 2013. http:// 
www.royalnavy.mod.uk/sitecore/content/home/the-fleet/ air-stations/rnas-
culdrose/fleet-requirements-air-direction- unit-fradu  
Salas, E., Wilson, K. A., Burke, C. S., & Priest, H. A. (2005). Using simulation-
based training to improve patient safety: what does it take?. The Joint 
Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety, 31(7), 363-371. 
 29 
Salmon, P. M., Cornelissen, M., & Trotter, M. J. (2012). Systems-based accident 
analysis methods: A comparison of Accimap, HFACS, and STAMP. Safety 
Science, 50(4), 1158-1170. 
Salmon, P. M., Read, G. J., & Stevens, N. J. (2016). Who is in control of road 
safety? A STAMP control structure analysis of the road transport system in 
Queensland, Australia. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 96, 140-151. 
Salmon, P. M., Walker, G. H., M. Read, G. J., Goode, N., & Stanton, N. A. 
(2017). Fitting methods to paradigms: are ergonomics methods fit for 
systems thinking?. Ergonomics, 60(2), 194-205. 
Stanton N. A., Salmon P. M. and Walker G. H. (2018)  Systems Thinking in 
Practice: Applications of the Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork 
Method.  CRC Press: Boca Raton, USA. 
Stanton, N. A., & Harvey, C. (2017). Beyond human error taxonomies in 
assessment of risk in sociotechnical systems: a new paradigm with the 
EAST ‘broken-links’ approach. Ergonomics, 60(2), 221-233. 
Stanton, N. A., Baber, C. and Harris, D.  (2008)  Modelling Command and 
Control: Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork.  Ashgate: Aldershot. 
Stanton, N. A., Rafferty, L. A., & Blane, A. (2012). Human Factors Analysis of 
Accidents in System of Systems. Journal of Battlefield Technology, 15(2), 
23- 30. 
Stanton, N. A., Salmon, P. M., Rafferty L. A., Walker, G. H., Baber, C., & 
Jenkins, D. P. (2013). Human Factors Methods: A Practical Guide for 
Engineering and Design. 2nd ed. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 30 
Stanton, N. A., Salmon, P. M., Walker, G. H., Baber, C., & Jenkins, D. P. (2005). 
Human Factors Methods: A Practical Guide for Engineering and Design. 
1st ed. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Stanton, N., & Roberts, A. (2017). Examining task, social and information 
networks in submarine command and control. IEEE Transactions on 
Human-Machine Systems. 
Swain, A. D. (1964). THERP (No. SC-R-64-1338). Sandia Corp., Albuquerque, 
New Mexico. 
Swain, A. D., and H. E. Guttmann. (1983). A Handbook of Human Reliability 
Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications, NUREG 
CR-1278. Washington, DC: USNRC.  
Thomas, J., Antoine, B., Fleming, C., Spencer, M., Hommes, Q., Ishimatsu, T., 
Helferich, J. (2013) STAMP experienced users tutorial., MIT. Retrived 
from http://psas.scripts.mit.edu/home/get_pdf.php?name=1-3-Advanced-
Experienced-STPA-Guided-Exercise.pdf  
Underwood, P., & Waterson, P. (2012). A critical review of the STAMP, FRAM 
and Accimap systemic accident analysis models. Advances in Human 
Aspects of Road and Rail Transportation. CRC Press, Boca Raton, 385-
394. 
Underwood, P., & Waterson, P. (2014). Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese 
Model and accident analysis: a comparative systemic analysis of the 
Grayrigg train derailment using the ATSB, AcciMap and STAMP 
models. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 68, 75-94. 
 31 
Walker, G. H., Salmon, P. M., Bedinger, M., & Stanton, N. A. (2017). Quantum 
ergonomics: shifting the paradigm of the systems 
agenda. Ergonomics, 60(2), 157-166. 
Young, K. L., & Salmon, P. M. (2015). Sharing the responsibility for driver 
distraction across road transport systems: a systems approach to the 
management of distracted driving. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 74, 
350-359. 
  
 32 
APPENDIX 
 
STPA safety constraints assigned to all control actions identified in the Hawk Risk to life case study 
 
Control 
action 
From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action Safety constraint 
Provision of 
procedures 
for 
assessment of 
risk to life 
(RtL) 
R
eg
u
la
to
r 
D
u
ty
 H
o
ld
er
 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to provide procedures for Risk to 
life assessment 
Must provide procedures for Risk to life 
assessment 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Provide wrong procedures for Risk to 
life assessment 
Must provide correct procedures for Risk to 
life assessment 
Incorrect timing or order Provide Risk to life procedures too late 
Must provide procedures for Risk to life 
assessment in sufficient time 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Risk to life process overly complex and 
bureaucratic 
Risk to life process should not be overly 
complex and bureaucratic 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long Risk to life process too vague Risk to life process should not be too vague 
Reporting of 
accidents and 
near misses 
D
u
ty
 H
o
ld
er
 
R
eg
u
la
to
r 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to report accident or near miss Must report all accidents or near misses 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Wrong cause for accident or near miss 
reported 
Right cause for accident or near miss must be 
reported 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Wrong consequence for accident or near 
miss reported 
Right consequence for accident or near miss 
must be reported 
Incorrect timing or order 
Accident or near miss reported too late 
(to be acted upon) 
Must report accident or near miss in 
sufficient time to be acted upon 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Incomplete report of accident or near 
miss 
Must ensure complete report of accident or 
near miss 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Too much detail in reporting so salient 
points are masked 
Must avoid over-reporting of detail 
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Control 
action 
From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action Safety constraint 
Report 
performance 
against risk 
boundaries D
u
ty
 H
o
ld
er
 
R
eg
u
la
to
r 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to report performance against risk 
boundaries 
Must report performance against risk 
boundaries 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Report performance against risk 
boundaries incorrectly 
Must report performance against risk 
boundaries correctly 
Incorrect timing or order 
Report performance against risk 
boundaries too late 
Report performance against risk boundaries 
with sufficient time to act 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Fail to report performance sufficiently 
against all risk boundaries 
Report performance sufficiently against all 
risk boundaries 
Identify 
hazards 
within Risk 
to life 
assessment 
process 
D
u
ty
 H
o
ld
er
 
P
il
o
t 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to define the hazards for flight 
operations to stay within acceptable risk 
Hazards for flight operations must be defined 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Setting incorrect hazards for flight 
operations to stay within acceptable risk 
Right hazards for flight operations must be 
set 
Incorrect timing or order 
Defining the hazards too late for the 
pilot to act 
Must define hazards in sufficient time for 
pilot to act 
Incorrect timing or order 
Fail to define all of the appropriate 
hazards for safe flight operations 
Hazards must be set when sufficient 
information is available 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Hazards defined too early based on 
insufficient information 
Hazards for flight operations must be defined 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Too many hazards defined, making the 
Risk to life advice overly complex  
Hazards for flight operations must be defined 
to an appropriate level of detail too avoid 
complexity 
Assign 
severity and 
criticality 
levels of risks D
u
ty
 H
o
ld
er
 
P
il
o
t 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to assign severity and criticality 
levels for risks 
Must assign severity and criticality levels for 
risks 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Wrong criticality or severity assigned to 
risk 
Right criticality or severity must be assigned 
to risk 
Incorrect timing or order 
Assign severity and criticality levels for 
risks too late 
Must assign severity and criticality levels for 
risks with sufficient time 
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Control 
action 
From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action Safety constraint 
Incorrect timing or order 
Assign severity and criticality levels for 
risks too early, without complete 
information 
Must assign severity and criticality levels for 
risks when all information about reported 
risks is known 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Fail to complete assignment of severity 
and criticality to risks 
Must complete assignment of severity and 
criticality to risks 
Reporting of 
any new risks 
in flight 
operations 
P
il
o
t 
D
u
ty
 H
o
ld
er
 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Failure to report any new risks to flight 
operations 
Must report any new risks 
Unsafe action or feedback provided Wrong risks reported Right risks must be reported 
Incorrect timing or order 
Risks reported too late (to be acted 
upon) 
Risks must be reported in sufficient time to 
be acted upon 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Not reporting all the risks (only 
reporting partial information) 
All risks must be reported 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Over-reporting of risks, resulting in 
trivial risks reported 
Trivial risks must not be reported 
Safe control 
of aircraft at 
250 feet to 
simulate 
missile 
P
il
o
t 
H
aw
k
 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Failure to maintain safe control or the 
aircraft (flying below 250 feet) 
Must maintain safe control of aircraft 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Failure to maintain safe control or the 
aircraft (flying above 250 feet) 
Must maintain safe control of aircraft 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Move out of safe altitude too early (not 
held 250 feet for the time necessary for 
Frigate to track as simulated missile) 
Hawk must stay at 250ft for appropriate 
duration 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long Move out of safe altitude too late 
Hawk must stay at 250ft for appropriate 
duration 
Altimeter 
readout of 
altitude H
aw
k
 
P
il
o
t 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Altimeter fails to provide height above 
sea level 
Provide accurate reference to altitude above 
sea level 
Unsafe action or feedback provided Error in altimeter reading Accurate height reference must be provided 
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Control 
action 
From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action Safety constraint 
(barometric 
pressure) 
Incorrect timing or order Pilot reads altimeter too late 
Pilot must read altimeter in sufficient time to 
respond 
Interpreting 
altitude of 
Hawk 
P
il
o
t 
 
S
ea
 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Pilot fails to look at sea Pilot must look at sea 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Pilot cannot see sea (poor visibility) 
Provide visual representation of sea under 
poor conditions 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Pilot fails to interpret height of Hawk 
above sea 
Pilot must correctly interpret the height of the 
Hawk above sea 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Pilot interprets wrong height of Hawk 
above sea 
Pilot must interpret height above sea 
accurately 
Incorrect timing or order Pilot interprets height above sea too late 
Pilot must interpret height above sea in 
sufficient time to respond 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Pilot fails to monitor height above sea 
for adequate amount of time to see 
changes 
Pilot must monitor height for adequate 
amount of time to see changes 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Pilot takes too long to interpret height of 
Hawk above sea 
Pilot must not take too long to interpret 
height of Hawk above sea 
Amplitude of 
wave height S
ea
 
P
il
o
t 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
No wave amplitude (flat sea)  N/A 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Amplitude of waves insufficient to 
judge height accurately 
N/A 
Provide 
simulation of 
approaching 
missile 
H
aw
k
 
F
ri
g
at
e 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Simulation of missile not provided Provide simulation of missile 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Not an accurate representation of a 
missile approach (e.g., see aircraft take-
off from base) 
Must provide accurate representation of 
missile approach 
Incorrect timing or order 
Simulated missile approach too fast or 
too slow 
Hawk must approach at appropriate speed to 
simulate missile accurately 
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Control 
action 
From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action Safety constraint 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Simulated approach abandoned too 
early 
Pilot must not abandon approach too early 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long Simulated approach carries on too late Pilot must not continue approach too late 
Radar 
detection of 
Hawk H
aw
k
 
F
ri
g
at
e 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to detect Hawk Ensure success of detection by radar 
Unsafe action or feedback provided Inaccurate identification of Hawk Must accurately identify Hawk 
Incorrect timing or order Detect Hawk too late Hawk must be detected as early as possible 
Use of radar 
F
ri
g
at
e 
H
aw
k
 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to use radar  Radar must be used by crew 
Unsafe action or feedback provided Fail to use appropriate radar  Must use appropriate radar 
Incorrect timing or order Switch radar on too early 
Radar must be switched on at appropriate 
time 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long Switch radar off to early Radar must not be switched off too early 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long Switch radar off too late Radar must not be switched off too late 
Feedback on 
realism of 
using Hawk 
to simulate a 
missile 
approach 
(post-event) 
C
re
w
 
P
il
o
t 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to provide feedback on realism of 
simulation 
Provide feedback on realism of simulation 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Provide incorrect feedback on 
simulation 
Must provide correct feedback on simulation 
Incorrect timing or order Provide feedback on simulation too late 
Must provide feedback on simulation in 
sufficient time to be acted upon 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Provide insufficient feedback on 
simulation 
Must provide sufficient feedback on 
simulation 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Over-reporting of feedback, resulting in 
trivial feedback reported, and essential 
feedback being lost 
Must report essential and not trivial feedback 
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Control 
action 
From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action Safety constraint 
Transmission 
of 
information 
about Hawk 
or missile 
track 
F
ri
g
at
e 
C
re
w
 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to display Hawk or missile track 
Frigate must be capable of displaying Hawk 
or missile track 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Inaccurate display of Hawk or missile 
track 
Must display accurate display of hawk or 
missile track 
Incorrect timing or order 
Display of Hawk or missile track too 
late to act upon 
Missile track must be displayed in sufficient 
time to be acted upon 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long Transmission stopped too soon Must not stop transmission to soon 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long Transmission applied too long Must not apply transmission too long 
Classification 
of threat C
re
w
 
F
ri
g
at
e 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to classify threat Crew must classify threat 
Unsafe action or feedback provided Misclassification of threat Must provide accurate classification of threat 
Incorrect timing or order 
Classification of threat too early based 
on insufficient information 
Classification of threat must be done in 
sufficient time to be acted upon 
Incorrect timing or order Classification of threat too late 
Classification of threat must be done in 
sufficient time to be acted upon 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Classification stopped to soon leading to 
inaccuracies due to incomplete 
information 
Must not stop classification too soon 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Too much time spent in classification, 
delays response 
Must not spend too much time in 
classification 
Deployment 
of weapons C
re
w
 
F
ri
g
at
e 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Fail to deploy weapons Weapons must be deployed by crew 
Unsafe action or feedback provided Deployment of wrong weapons Must deploy correct weapons 
Incorrect timing or order Deployment of weapons too early  
Weapons must be deployed at the correct 
time 
Incorrect timing or order Deployment of weapons too late 
Weapons must be deployed at the correct 
time 
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Control 
action 
From To Guide sentence Unsafe control action Safety constraint 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Stop deployment of weapons before 
target destroyed 
Deployment of weapons must continue until 
target is destroyed 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Deployment of weapons at a redundant 
target, waste of weapons 
Deployment of weapons must not continue 
after target is destroyed 
Interpreting 
sea 
conditions C
re
w
 
S
ea
 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Crew fails to look at sea Crew must look at sea 
Action or feedback required but not 
provided 
Crew cannot see sea (poor visibility) 
Provide visual representation of sea under 
poor conditions 
Incorrect timing or order Crew interprets sea conditions too late 
Crew must interpret height above sea in 
sufficient time to respond 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Crew fails to monitor sea conditions for 
an adequate amount of time to see 
changes 
Crew must monitor sea conditions for 
adequate amount of time to see changes 
Stopped too soon / Applied too long 
Crew takes too long to interpret sea 
conditions 
Crew must not take too long to interpret sea 
conditions 
Sea 
conditions S
ea
 
C
re
w
 
Unsafe action or feedback provided 
Sea conditions present a danger to safe 
control of the Frigate 
Crew should not operate the Frigate in 
dangerous sea conditions 
 
 
